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radicalization: goal regulation theory
and a personality × threat
affordance hypothesis
×
Ian McGregor1*, Joseph Hayes1 and Mike Prentice2
1 Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada, 2 Department of Psychology, University of
Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
A new set of hypotheses is presented regarding the cause of aggressive religious
radicalization (ARR). It is grounded in classic and contemporary theory of human
motivation and goal regulation, together with recent empirical advances in personality,
social, and neurophysiological psychology. We specify personality traits, threats, and
group affordances that combine to divert normal motivational processes toward
ARR. Conducive personality traits are oppositional, anxiety-prone, and identity-weak
(i.e., morally bewildered). Conducive threats are those that arise from seemingly
insurmountable external forces and frustrate effective goal regulation. Conducive
affordances include opportunity for immediate and concrete engagement in active
groups that are powered by conspiracy narratives, infused with cosmic significance,
encouraging of moral violence, and sealed with religious unfalsifiability. We propose that
ARR is rewarding because it can spur approach motivated states that mask vulnerability
for people whose dispositions and circumstances would otherwise leave them mired in
anxious distress.
Keywords: religion, radicalization, aggression, approach motivation, avoidance motivation, anxiety, groups
Introduction
“We have killed all of the children in the auditorium. . .what do we do now?”
—Taliban gunman, December 16, 2014
After methodically shooting all 132 children and 12 teachers at a school in Peshawar, Pakistan,
the Taliban militant, Abuzar, called his handler for further instructions. The answer came back,
“wait for the army to arrive, kill them, and then blow yourself up” (Khan, 2014). Abuzar and
the six other gunmen complied and detonated their vests on cue. This kind of self-immolating,
aggressive religious radicalization (ARR) has recently animated high proﬁle Islamist atrocities by
the Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda, Taliban, Boko Harem, al-Shabaab, and lone-wolf extremists all
over the world. Although Islam is currently in the spotlight, ARR is not a Muslim phenomenon.
Throughout history its callous extremes have blighted all major religions traditions (Armstrong,
2000). This paper provides a theoretical framework with data-driven hypotheses about how basic
human motivations interact with situational aﬀordances to make ARR alluring.
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In the recent IS instantiation, over 30,000 young men and
women from over 100 Asian, Middle Eastern, and Western
countries have abandoned their normal lives to go ﬁght with
IS in foreign territory and abject living conditions. Indeed,
more British Muslims have joined IS than the British military
(Barrett, 2014a,b; BBC, 2015; The Soufan Group, 2015; Weaver,
2015). When they get there they sometimes burn their passports
as a show of commitment before submitting to the harsh
regimen of discipline for the fascist cause. They know they
may die soon after arriving, and many do, either as suicide
bombers or as casualties in battles picked with a more powerful
enemy—a coalition that includes many of the world’s most
powerful countries. Despite the shocking atrocities perpetrated
by IS that include beheadings, cruciﬁxions, rapes, pedophilia,
and genocidal slaughter (BBC, 2014), and that have been
well publicized on YouTube, IS continues to attract foreign
recruits who are often among the most zealous (Barrett,
2014b). What is the appeal of enthusiastically perpetrating
atrocities in the name of a religion that preaches mercy?
How can personality and demographic proﬁles of recruits so
often be normal and well-educated (Post, 1990, 2005; Barrett,
2014a).
We present a basic motivational framework that contests
popular views claiming ARR is primarily a pragmatic
revolutionary strategy, or driven by self-serving superstitions,
or fueled by the particularly aggressive nature of any particular
religion. We draw on classic and contemporary psychological
theory and over 30 years of experimental research showing how
and why psychological threats cause belligerent defenses and
reactive approach motivation (RAM; McGregor et al., 2010a;
Jonas et al., 2014). We hypothesize that ARR arises from personal
predispositions, anxiogenic threats, and group aﬀordances
that combine to divert normal motivational processes toward
approach motivation for ARR. Each factor alone is not enough,
but conducive personality, threats, and aﬀordances, together,
are potent. Our view is compatible with insights about how
motivation for worldview defenses, signiﬁcance, meaningful
engagement, identity-fusion, group-based control, belonging
in action groups, and compensatory conviction and consensus
might propel ARR (McGregor et al., 2001, 2005; Rothschild et al.,
2009; Atran, 2010; Sageman, 2011; Fritsche et al., 2013; Hogg,
2014; Kruglanski et al., 2014; Swann and Buhrmester, 2015). Our
view augments this previous work by grounding its hypotheses
in primitive motivational substrates that can provide additional
depth to the emerging understanding of motivation for ARR.
Our main premise is that ARR is rewarding because it spurs
approach motivated states that mute anxiety for people whose
personalities and social circumstances would otherwise leave
them anxious and depressed (McGregor et al., 2010b; Jonas
et al., 2014; Hayes et al., 2015). We begin by reviewing classic
theories foundational to understanding ARR. We then link
them to contemporary goal-regulation premises, theories, and
recent advances in RAM theory. We next deﬁne the components
of ARR, and use empirical research ﬁndings to justify our
personality × threat × aﬀordance hypotheses. We conclude by
suggesting strategies for testing our hypotheses in the lab and real
world.
Classic Theory
A premise in classic and contemporary theory is that conﬂicts,
frustrations, and uncertainties can propel belligerent reactions far
removed from the eliciting diﬃculties. Sigmund and Anna Freud
popularized the view that conﬂicting motivations in competing
directions can arouse bizarre and extreme defenses against the
ensuing anxiety. “Excessively intense,” “supervalent” thoughts
form “mental dams” that eﬀectively repress the oﬀending
conﬂicts Gay (1989, pp. 200, 261–262). From this perspective
ARR-relevant defense mechanisms such as turning against the
self, rationalization, fantasy, regression to childish tendencies,
and projection of one’s own hostilities onto others would be
considered mechanisms of repression that help people escape
from other motivational conﬂicts in their lives (Freud, 1946).
Lewin (1933) brought Freudian ideas into a more general
theory of motivation and goal regulation by showing that
conﬂicts and uncertainties cause a kind of anxious tension that
persists as long as goals remain impeded. If people have no
clear way to relieve the tension arising from their (often social)
conﬂicts then they escape from the ﬁeld of tension by resorting to
fantasy, submission, or belligerence (Lewin, 1933, 1935).
Neo-analytic theorists similarly proposed that aggression is
a reﬂexive response to frustration for people and animals.
The frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard et al., 1939;
Berkowitz, 1989) is implicit in neoanalytic views that failure
to forge identities grounded in prosociality tilts people toward
fanaticism and oppositional power over others (Horney, 1950;
Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956; Erikson, 1959). Horney (1950,
pp. 86–109, 184) and Adler (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956,
pp. 259–261) respectively referred to this tendency as “arrogant
righteousness” and “neurotic pride” or a “superiority complex,”
wherein grandiose and oppositional facades mask insecure selves.
Fromm (1941) viewed such defensive tendencies as escapes
from existential freedom and saw conformity, authoritarianism,
fascism, and destructiveness as symptoms of human’s inability to
cope with the frustrating uncertainty about how to make choices
in life. People cling aggressively to externally referenced “frames
of orientation and devotion” to avoid becoming overwhelmed by
existential uncertainty (Fromm, 1947, p. 48). Antisocial extremes
replace gnawing uncertainty with decisive commitment that
relieves angst. Durkheim (1897/1951) viewed uncertainty about
what to do as noxious enough to cause suicide. If viable family
relationships or cultural norms are not available to provide
clear direction and purpose, people use suicide to escape the
unbearable burden of choice (Durkheim, 1897/1951; see also
Baumeister, 1990).
Sartre’s (1956) existential philosophical perspective similarly
held that uncertainty arising from radical freedom spurs attempts
to escape from the nausea of uncertain self-awareness by
conforming to group norms (Barnes, 1973). Under this view,
masochistic extremes of submission to authority and sadistic
extremes of domination and hate are attempts to suppress
uncertainty arising from absence of objective truths that could
guide one’s choices in life. Masochism and sadism reduce the
uncertainty associated with awareness of multiple perspectives
by eliminating one’s own and/or others’ subjective perspectives.
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Problematic subjectivity, with its conﬂicting perspectives and
uncertainties, is replaced by the solid ground of supposed
objective authority.
These neoanalytic and existential ideas were the foundation
for the Adorno et al. (1950) treatise on the authoritarian
personality and causes of fascist disdain for deviants. Authentic
identity development requires a vulnerable process of trial and
error exploration (Rogers, 1951; Erikson, 1959; Marcia, 1980;
Deci and Ryan, 1991). If this process is blocked by unsupportive
people or chaotic social structures, then conﬁdent personal values
and priorities for resolving uncertainty are not developed, and
people turn to the dictates of powerful others and groups.
Fusing or identifying with a fascist ingroup can thereby become
psychologically vital, and critics become the enemy.
These classic theoretical views predict the link between
conﬂict, uncertainty, and frustration, and aggressive
radicalization, but they do not imply a speciﬁcally religious
form of aggressive radicalization. James (2006) made that
connection around the time that Freud was penning his ﬁrst
ideas about repression via commitment to excessively intense
thoughts (Gay, 1989, pp. 200, 261–262). James (2006, p. 240,
399) observed that “religious rapture and moral enthusiasm are
unifying states of mind that incline the sand and grit of selfhood
to disappear,” and that can unify a “discordant self.” Consistent
with our approach-motivation hypothesis he further proposed:
“We shall see how inﬁnitely passionate a thing religion at its
highest ﬂights can be. Like love, like wrath, like hope, ambition,
jealousy, like every other instinctive eagerness and impulse, it
adds... a new sphere of power” (James, 2006, p. 58).
These repression-related views were ﬁrst put into goal-
regulation language by Lewin’s (1933, 1935) understanding
of how strong goals and commitments can clear away other
conﬂicts, leaving people feeling sanguine and single-minded
(reviewed in McGregor, 2003). Lewin (1933, p. 609) paved the
way for a goal-regulation view of zealous religious devotion as
an idealistic commitment that can function like a motivational
“ﬁeld of force” to push other uncertainties and frustrations out
of awareness (see McGregor et al., 2010b, 2012b, for elaboration
on the goal and emotion-regulation function of ideals).
Contemporary social psychological and social neuroscience
research now provides a clearer, less metaphorical understanding
of the basic motivational mechanics beneath Lewin’s seminal
goal-regulation ideas.
Contemporary Theories of Threat and
Defense
In the second half of the 20th century, personality and
social psychological research began empirically testing and
reﬁning classic theories about causes of defensive social
phenomena related to ARR. Hundreds of experiments on
cognitive dissonance theory (begun by Lewin’s student, Festinger,
1957) demonstrated that experimentally manipulated cognitive
conﬂicts could cause extremes of opinion rationalization that
deﬁed logic, including dubious claims by religious cult members
(Festinger et al., 1956). The ﬁrst generation of dissonance
theory and research had its roots in classic psychodynamic
theory, from Freud, through Lewin, to Festinger’s experimental
demonstrations. Its growth became even more psychodynamic
with neo-analytically inspired demonstrations of compensation.
Research began to support Allport’s (1943, p. 466) assertion
that various ego defenses provide “ﬂuid compensation” for
psychological discomfort arising from threats, conﬂicts, and
uncertainties. Self-serving aﬃrmations of worth, conviction,
morality, meaning, or adaptive adequacy of any kind were found
to mute threat-induced distress, even if they did not directly
address the content of the original threat (e.g., see Steele, 1988;
Tesser, 2000; McGregor et al., 2001; Heine et al., 2006). As
Lewin would have predicted, the aﬃrmations make the anxious
uncertainties and conﬂicts less motivationally salient (McGregor,
2006a), which makes them less aversive (McGregor et al., 1999).
A proliferation of threat and defense theories sprouted
around the intuitive idea that ﬂuid compensation occurred
because threats to a psychological resource (esteem, security,
integrity, immortality, belongingness, meaning, or control)
aroused compensatory reactions that served to replenish the
threatened psychological resource, often in disguised ways.
For example, if an anxiety-inducing failure threat caused a
worldview defense reaction involving hostile derogation of an
outgroup or moral oﬀender, various compensatory theories
would interpret this as disguised compensation for threatened
esteem, certainty, conviction, integrity, immortality, security,
belongingness, meaning, or control (i.e., depending on the
authors’ theoretical allegiance; see Jonas et al., 2014 for review).
Compensation perspectives would accordingly view ARR as an
indirect strategy for restoring whatever basic need had been
indirectly undermined by psychological threat. As powerful
and generative as resource compensation theories became,
their proliferation and explanatory competition ushered in an
integrative theoretical approach to understanding threat and
defense processes at a more basic motivational level.
Goal Regulation Theory: A Lens for
Understanding ARR
Primitive motivational structures in humans, mice, and other
vertebrate brains are organized around goal dynamics and
anxiety. Behavioral, lesion, and pharmacological studies reveal
that goal frustration and uncertainty are the prime causes of
anxious distress, mediated by the septo-hippocampal behavioral
inhibition system (BIS; Gray and McNaughton, 2000). The
neurophysiology of anxiety is diﬀerent from that arising from
other aversive states like sadness or panic. As with Lewin’s (1933,
1935) idea of tension, anxiety arises from the approach-avoidance
conﬂicts inherent in goal blockage, uncertainty, novelty, and
frustration. Recent revisions to Gray’s theory (by his student,
Corr, 2008), emphasize that BIS activity is inversely related to
activity of the other main motivational system, the behavioral
activation system (BAS). The BAS promotes single-minded
approach motivation—the “impulse to go toward” (Harmon-
Jones et al., 2013, p. 291). It is an eager, goal commitment
system that, when active, mutes the BIS (Corr, 2008; Nash
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et al., 2012). Eﬀective goal regulation is maintained by the
interplay between these two systems. When goals are going well
the BAS predominates and makes people feel energized, eager,
and single-mindedly committed to approach of the focal goal.
BAS activation automatically inhibits possible distractions and
conﬂicts, and allows people to focus on eagerly approaching
identiﬁed incentives, free from anxious preoccupation with their
worries. If a serious conﬂict or uncertainty erupts along the way
and succeeds in activating the BIS, however, then the BAS is
muted and three primary BIS outputs result. All ongoing goals are
inhibited to stop the animal from doing whatever is not working;
anxious distress further discourages persistence at ongoing goals;
and vigilance dilates to help the animal notice a wider range of
possible threats or opportunities that could cue single-minded
withdrawal or approach to get the animal out of the conﬂicted
and anxious state, and onto a more viable track.
This account of BIS and BAS follows Lewin’s (1933,
1935) view of how tensions aroused by goal conﬂict can
be blocked out by focused immersion in other goals. In
more contemporary language, activating the BAS through goal
commitment eliminates the hesitant, anxious vigilance associated
with the BIS. Throwing oneself into a commitment like ARR
could accordingly be a way to eﬀectively repress other anxious
conﬂicts (Harmon-Jones et al., 2009; Nash et al., 2011; McGregor
et al., 2013b; see Jonas et al., 2014 for overview of the
underlying basic processes and links to threats and defensive
reactions).
This goal and emotion regulation function of the BAS has
been empirically demonstrated in humans by personality and
social psychology experiments focused on goal commitment,
shielding, and implementation. Tenacious goal commitments
and related eager approach motivation processes activate the BAS
and narrow motivational attention to the focal goal (Harmon-
Jones et al., 2011, 2012), shielding it from interference by
other conﬂicting or competing goals (Shah et al., 2002). The
single-mindedness facilitates vigorous goal completion (Elliot
and McGregor, 1999; Harmon-Jones et al., 2009) and is also
aﬀectively rewarding—people feel more optimistic when actively
engaged in implementing a commitment than when deliberating
about alternative possibilities (Taylor and Gollwitzer, 1995). The
same insulation from conﬂicts and uncertainties can come from
eager immersion in more abstract goals, values, and group
identiﬁcations (McGregor et al., 2001; McGregor, 2006a, Study 1;
McGregor and Marigold, 2003, Study 4; McGregor et al., 2005,
Study 4) because values and groups also activate the BAS
(Agroskin, unpublished doctoral thesis, McGregor, unpublished
data), especially if they are extreme (Sleegers et al., 2015).
Cybernetic theories of goal regulation posit that ideals and values
are abstract goals that function as self-guides or system concepts
to organize and coordinate the array of subordinate, more
concrete goals (Higgins, 1996; Carver and Scheier, 1998; Hirsh
and Kang, 2015). Extremes are resistant to ambivalence, so they
should be particularly eﬀective as clear self-guides (Newby-Clark
et al., 2002).
These basic goal regulation processes furnish a parsimonious,
mechanistic account for the operation of classic theoretical
ideas about why people in anxious circumstances turn to
excessively intense thoughts, moral enthusiasms, exclusive ﬁelds
of force associated with goals, or the other manifestations
of rigid and extreme opinion, devotion, and authoritarian
hostility. All might eﬀectively function as levers for BAS-
activated approach-motivated states that are rewarding because
they mute BIS activity. Considering that anger is also a
powerfully BAS-activating phenomenon (Carver and Harmon-
Jones, 2009), it seems plausible that extreme commitment to
ARRmight be an appealing response to anxiety-inducing threats,
uncertainties, frustrations, and injustices because ARR contains
several elements capable of transitioning people from “anxiety to
approach” (Jonas et al., 2014).
From Anxiety to Reactive Approach
Motivation for ARR
The basic-process ideas outlined above were ﬁrst organized in
papers identifying exaggerated conviction, pride, consensus,
and intergroup animosity as levers for approach-motivation-
related states that people use to downregulate threat-activated
BIS (McGregor et al., 2005; McGregor, 2006b). Over the
last 10 years this speculation has been empirically supported
by rigorous experimental research. Anxiety-related threats
(dissonance, uncertainty, failure, control loss, mortality salience,
relationship distress, insecurity, goal-frustration) that have
caused extreme “compensatory” reactions in past research
have also now been found to cause neural indicators of BIS
activation at ﬁrst, and then RAM (reviewed in Proulx et al.,
2012; Jonas et al., 2014). The measures of RAM include basic
neural, perceptual, and aﬀective evidence, along with eager
and idealistic commitment to personal goals and commitments
in everyday life (McGregor et al., 2007, 2009a, 2010a, 2013b;
Nash et al., 2011; Greenaway et al., 2015). Importantly,
these same threats also cause self-reported endorsement of
religious extremes and increased willingness to kill and die
for religious beliefs (Pyszczynski et al., 2006; McGregor et al.,
2008, 2010b, 2013b; Rothschild et al., 2009; Wichman, 2010).
Further, laboratory experiments now indicate that elements
of ARR, and religious devotion itself, can cause neural,
perceptual, and self-report evidence of approach motivation
(reviewed in Jonas et al., 2014; Agroskin, unpublished doctoral
thesis, McGregor, unpublished data). Anxiety-to-approach
dynamics are thus well positioned to help explain the enigma
of ARR.
Pragmatic and Palliative RAM
It is important to acknowledge, however, that levers for activating
RAM are not necessarily defensive and irrational. Constructive
responses to anxiogenic circumstances can also provide RAM
relief from anxiety. Indeed, this may be the most usual
and adaptive function of anxiety-to-approach processes, as in
tenacious striving for ﬁnancial security after deprivation, or
for success or love after failure or rejection. It is when direct
resolution opportunities seem blocked and hopeless, however,
that people turn to merely palliative defenses like ARR to activate
RAM for relief.
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It has been argued that ARR might be a direct, constructive
form of freedom ﬁghting aimed at restoring social justice for
oppressed people (Armstrong, 2014). The suﬀering inﬂicted on
Muslims caused by the long history of Western hegemony,
hypocrisy, political interference, exploitation for oil, economic
sanctions that mostly harm poor civilians, and military invasions
have been identiﬁed as catalysts for Islamist extremes. Although
realistic grievance is surely part of the story (Armstrong, 2014;
Barrett, 2014a,b), and ARRmay be partly motivated by pragmatic
motivation to make constructive improvements, characteristics
of ARR cast doubt on the adequacy of such straightforward
explanations.
First, ARR is often rash and counter-productive. In one
of the ﬁrst examples of ARR that gave rise to the word
“zeal,” an oppressed Zealot sect of Judaism assassinated anyone
who disagreed with their extreme agenda, even those in
their own group who did not seem devout enough. Their
extremism brought annihilation from the governing Romans.
A similar plight befell the ﬁrst Christian Crusaders. After
Pope Urban’s rousing 1086 CE speech about restoring the
glory of Charlemagne and saving the Holy Land from Evil, a
band of overly enthusiastic and unprepared Crusaders broke
from France for Jerusalem before the designated date. In
their zeal they began slaughtering anyone along the way
who seemed a diﬀerent race or religion. They were soon
annihilated by the ﬁrst wave of organized resistance that
they faced (Durant, 1950). The violence of IS and other
ARR groups seems similarly rash and counter-productive
(Post, 1990; Barrett, 2014b). Their self-publicized atrocities
may have some strategic value insofar as they discourage
resistance in the towns they occupy, but they have also turned
most of the world against them. Even predominantly Muslim
countries like Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United
Arab Emirates, and Turkey, that might otherwise have been
sympathetic to legitimate social justice grievances, have joined
a coalition with Western powers against IS. The Muslim-
on-Muslim atrocities of IS have even alienated the radical
Islamist group, al-Qaeda, from which IS evolved (Barrett,
2014b).
A second reason for doubting the pragmatics of ARR is
the retrograde nature of its religious claims. Mature religion
is usually associated with humility, recognition of mystery,
compassionate concern for others, and aversion to violence
(Armstrong, 2006, 2009; Schumann et al., 2014; Shariﬀ et al.,
2015). These characteristics are at odds with the fascist, black
and white, superstitious, and hostile characteristics of ARR that
more closely resemble psychological defenses (Post, 1990; Jonas
et al., 2014). Indeed, among ARR recruits there is often only a thin
veneer of religious knowledge supporting their devotion (Atran,
2010; Barrett, 2014a). Pragmatic devotion would presumably be
built on a more mature foundation.
The third reason to doubt the pragmatics of ARR is the
risky self-destructiveness of its members. New recruits leave
lives and loved ones behind and risk everything. A longer
life of careful, strategic devotion to a solid cause would
presumably accomplish more than a quick and dirty death for
a dubious and sensational cause. The relish to join, ﬁght, and
risk for an extreme cause seems to have more psychological
appeal than instrumental beneﬁt (Nash, unpublished doctoral
dissertation; McGregor et al., 2013b; Black et al., 2014; Hogg,
2014).
A Concrete and Social Approach
Our speciﬁc hypotheses below about the kinds of people
and circumstances conducive to ARR are informed by a
recently advanced taxonomy of phenomena people approach
for relief from BIS-activation. People react to anxiety-inducing
experiences by approaching phenomena that are either personal
or social and either concrete or abstract. The four domains of
phenomena people use to activate RAM are accordingly concrete
personal (e.g., money, personal aggression, power, control);
concrete social (e.g., group membership, group aggression,
group power, group status); abstract personal (personal values,
ideals, moral convictions); and abstract social (collective
worldviews, ideologies). Phenomena in all quadrants can be
eagerly pursued to activate approach motivated states (Jonas
et al., 2014). Ostensibly religious phenomena can populate
all four quadrants, e.g., ritual action in the concrete personal
quadrant; coordinated group rituals, coalitional action, or
intergroup hostility in the concrete social quadrant; idiosyncratic
ideals and values in the abstract personal quadrant; and
consensual worship of cultural symbols, worldviews, and
meanings in the abstract social quadrant. Our working deﬁnition
of religion emphasizes the idealistic aspects of religious
devotion (see below) but the concrete aspects can serve as
accessible sacraments for orienting toward the idealistic elements,
especially (as we develop below) for people who may prefer
concrete engagement. Our view is consistent with Armstrong’s
(2000, 2009) claim that fundamentalist ARR cleaves to the
concrete in an arguably blasphemous attempt to remove
the inherent mystery from its understanding of God. Our
position here on the concrete nature of ARR is accordingly
a departure from our past focus on more abstract aspects
of idealistic religious devotion (e.g., McGregor et al., 2010b,
2012a).
Past investigations of phenomena people spontaneously use
to activate RAM focused on abstract-personal levers. Random
assignment to various, 2–5 min anxiety-related experiences
(e.g., personal uncertainties, mortality salience, relationship
insecurities, social exclusion, performance anxiety) caused people
to become more extreme in their moral opinion conviction
and consensus estimates, and in pursuit of idealistic goals,
convictions, and meanings (McGregor et al., 2009b). These
abstract-personal reactions appear to relieve anxious distress by
activating approach-motivated states (Jonas et al., 2014). The
same threats also heighten abstract-personal varieties of religious
devotion—more conﬁdent certainty in the objective truth of self-
identiﬁed religious beliefs, more determination to live according
to them, more identiﬁcation with them, and more willingness
to argue in defense of them (McGregor et al., 2008, 2010b,
2013b).
People with eager, idealistic, and approach-motivation-
correlated traits have been most inclined toward use of abstract-
personal levers for RAM (reviewed in Jonas et al., 2014).
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Based on this we had initially assumed that eager, idealistic,
and conﬁdent kinds of people should be especially inclined
toward ARR, under the assumption that ARR was essentially
an abstract ideology (McGregor et al., 2008, 2010b, found that
eager, idealistic people were most inclined toward reactive,
abstract religious extremes). Our most recent research, however,
suggests that the kind of abstract-personal religious zeal that
our previous research focused on is not what ARR usually
revolves around. Like ethnocentrism and outgroup derogation,
ARR is usually idealistically impoverished, and seems to
revolve more around opportunity for concrete participation
in hostile authoritarian groups that mobilize aggressive action
disguised by a veneer of oversimpliﬁed ideology (Post, 2005).
We propose that it is through this concrete participation in
simpliﬁed, black and white ideologies that identity-weak people
(i.e., morally bewildered) are able to acquire an externally
referenced sense of “identity, purpose, belonging or spiritual
fulﬁllment” for a “greater sense of purpose and meaning in
their lives” (Barrett, 2014a, p. 18; Barrett, 2014b, p. 7; Atran,
2015). Groups, aggression, and action can activate approach
motivate states, and approach motivated states feel meaningful
(McGregor et al., 2012b). Given the seeming concrete and
authoritarian characteristics of ARR, we here hypothesize
diﬀerent predisposing personality traits than in our past research.
Whereas identity-strong people have tended toward abstract-
personal levers for RAM, identity-weak people should be most
inclined toward ARR.
Without the guiding and constraining inﬂuence of mature
personal or religious identity, which tend to be prosocial,
the more concrete, risky, aggressive, hostile, and coalitional
kinds of levers for activating RAM could be especially alluring.
Indeed, markers of concrete coalitional but not intrinsic religion
predict support for suicide bombers and prejudice (Allport
and Ross, 1967; Ginges et al., 2009). A limitation of concrete,
extrinsic religion, however, may be that it is less reliable and
eﬃcient in maintaining approach-motivated relief. It requires
involved physical engagement because it may not be as
easily summoned as abstract ideals in private imaginations
(McGregor et al., 2012b). Further, despite temporary relief
engagement in ARR might provide, its antisocial hostility
presumably impedes harmonious social functioning and brings
more social conﬂict and anxious insecurity over time. Indeed,
internal conﬂict is predicted to be the downfall of IS (Barrett,
2015).
Once it becomes clear to identity-weak people that ARR
doesn’t work as well as hoped, they might either amplify zeal, or
withdraw altogether from life so as to activate unmitigated
avoidance motivation. Anxiety is a function of the BIS
response to simultaneous approach and avoidance cues. It
can accordingly be relieved by either singular approach or
singular avoidance (Hayes et al., 2015). Withdrawal from
concern with life outcomes would make hostile and antisocial
levers for RAM easier to engage without regard for possible
consequences. In sum, the appeal of ARR may be that it
oﬀers opportunity for toggling between concrete approach
(aggressive, powerful, hostile, coalitional) and fatalistic
withdrawal from life through self-immolating extremes.
Both are anxiety-relief strategies available to identity-weak
people.
Components of ARR
Aggressive
By aggressive we mean a tendency to assert ones will against
others, oneself, or any symbolic or concrete target in a way
that can augment the feeling of power, status, or control vis-à-
vis the target. Belittling, overpowering, or destroying others, the
self, institutions, or properties are aggressive by this deﬁnition.
Violence is a concrete manifestation of aggression.
Religious
As reviewed above, philosophical and goal-regulation
perspectives propose that humans need moral ideals to
guide concrete goals. Without moral ideals humans can become
mired in conﬂict among all the imaginable possibilities for
action. Following Fromm’s (1973, p. 260–261) view that a
primary existential need for humans is “an object of total
devotion. . .to be a focal point of all his [sic] strivings,” we view
religion as a vehicle for moral values that is often bolstered by
consensual rituals and symbols (Geertz and Banton, 1966). This
morality-focused view of religion is compatible with Durkheim’s
(1976/1912) seminal claim that religions are not necessarily
about gods (though they often are—Gods are potent symbols),
but rather that they revolve around group convictions about
what is to be valued as sacred, above any particular temporal
concern. Worship and ritual involve active group aﬃrmations
of these sacred phenomena as worthy of veneration. From this
perspective, the essence of religion is less about superstitious
belief in existence of supernatural entities and their intra-group
moral policing function (cf., Shariﬀ and Norenzayan, 2007) than
about eager devotion to moral commitments that function as
arbiters for coordinating enthusiastic action within individuals
and groups.
Some historians of religion have similarly concluded that
the essence of religious devotion revolves around functional
meanings that help people set priorities for eﬀective living (Smith,
1986; Armstrong, 2006). Armstrong argues that the jagged
evolution toward compassionate values across religious traditions
has been occurring because prosocial values are the only kind
that can sustain consensus and cooperation, and constrain costly
inter-group violence. Drawing on existential, psychological,
and religious-historical perspectives we accordingly deﬁne the
essence of religion as a moral orientation toward action that
is often but not necessarily anchored by ideas of God, that is
often but not necessarily bolstered by consensual ideology and
ritual, and that is usually prosocial but can sometimes endorse
aggressive and fascist extremes.
The vulnerability toward fascist extremes exists because
devotion to abstract moral ideals can be diﬃcult for solitary
individuals. Ideals and values have no concrete referents and
so rely on consensus for conﬁdence (Festinger, 1950; Wicklund
and Gollwitzer, 1982; Hardin and Higgins, 1996). “Conservative,”
coalitional moral foundations relating to ingroup consensus
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(authority, loyalty, purity) sometimes co-occur along with the
more universal social justice moral foundations (fairness and
care; see Graham et al., 2009 for evidence of conservative
vs. universal moral foundations). Among people who are
vulnerable to anxiety (Jost et al., 2003; Olvet and Hajcak,
2008) and in frustrating circumstances conducive to aggressive
reactions and ingroup cohesion and consensus (Dollard et al.,
1939; Shah et al., 1998; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Miller
et al., 2003; McGregor et al., 2005; Burke et al., 2010), the
balance between social justice idealism and the more concrete
coalitional and authoritarian moral foundations can list toward
coalitional/authoritarian. When they eclipse social justice, ARR
can ﬂourish.
Radicalization
Radicalization is a shift from mainstream to anti-normative
or comparatively extreme ideological convictions that animate
eagerness to challenge the status quo. Radicalization is neither
necessarily aggressive nor religious. Martin Luther King Jr. and
Mahatma Ghandi were radicals, as was Tommy Douglass, the
politician who won universal health coverage for Canadians in
the 1960s. Barack Obama’s quest for more universal healthcare
in the US is still considered radically subversive by half of the
US population. All of the above might be considered religious
radicals to the extent that their radical determination for social
justice was girded by their own religious values. Their somewhat
religious radicalization was pragmatic and constructive, however,
not aggressive.
From our perspective ARR is usually motivated more by the
psychological appeal of the radical and aggressive lifestyle than
by a constructive assessment of what the radical agenda is likely
to accomplish or by thoughtful religious integrity (see also Post,
1990; Atran, 2010, 2015, for more on the superﬁcial religious
knowledge and idealistic impoverishment of ARR recruits). We
propose that people are drawn to ARR simply because it feels
right. Here we develop a theory for why something that seems
bizarre and abhorrent tomost people could be attractive for some.
Based on past theory and research we hypothesize that speciﬁc
personality, threat, and aﬀordance factors combine to make ARR
feel right.
Factors Conducive to ARR: Personality,
Threat, and Affordance
When episodes of ARR occur they are typically met with
astonished exclamations of “why him,” “why there.” Why, for
example, did one sleepy Norwegian town spawn eight IS recruits
(Higgins, 2015), one pre-university school in Montreal 11
(Perreaux, 2015), and one elementary school in Morocco ﬁve of
the sevenMadrid train bombers (Atran, 2010)? Part of the reason
may be that the individuals belonged to tightly knit, action-
oriented social networks, such as neighborhood groups or soccer
teams that set a group-action template for them to engage in
heroic adventure together in another context (Atran, 2010). But
most people in buddy-groups are not drawn to ARR. Blaming
personality predispositions or demographic characteristics is also
little help because perpetrators of ARR are surprisingly normal
(Post, 2005). Environmental threats, frustrations, and anxieties
may similarly be ingredients (McGregor et al., 2010b), but most
anxious and frustrated people do not turn to ARR.
Diﬃculty identifying causal factors in past research may
have arisen from failure to simultaneously consider combined
personality, threat, and aﬀordance interactions. Here we
identify 10 ARR-facilitating inﬂuences across the three factors
(personality, threat, and aﬀordance). For each inﬂuence to be
above average in prevalence would occur by chance with a 210
probability of only 1/1024. It is not surprising, then, if our view
is correct, that isolated personality traits or threat inﬂuences
often fail empirical tests of relevance. Some laboratory studies
(described below) have found combinations of a few of these
10 inﬂuences can cause self-reported movement toward aspects
of ARR. Real life ARR surely requires more inﬂuences to align,
however, because barriers to ARR in real life are higher than for
self-reported opinions or intentions.
The personality factor includes three inﬂuences from normal-
range personality traits that lean toward: (a) oppositional
personality traits related to aggression (disagreeableness,
hostility, anger, narcissism, or low self-control); (b) high BIS
personality traits that incline people toward the experience of
anxiety; and (c) identity-weak personality traits that undermine
capacity to assert personal value priorities, take initiative, or
maintain self-regulatory control. The threat factor includes two
inﬂuences: (a) external control threats that undermine faith
in the social system (that identity-weak people are especially
inclined to rely on; and (b) life circumstances that underscore
hopelessness. The aﬀordance factor includes ﬁve inﬂuences: (a)
opportunity for immediate, concrete engagement with active
ARR groups, (b) a consensual injustice narrative that condenses
conspiracy-theory blame for system and self-dissatisfaction onto
the outgroup, (c) narratives that convey heroic participation in a
cosmic battle between good (own group) vs. evil (outgroup), (d)
justifying narratives for religious aggression, and (e) unfalsiﬁable
religious arguments.
Personality
Oppositional
A history of delinquency or criminal activity prior to ARR is a
common but not a clear predictor (Post, 1990; Atran, 2010). Its
incidence may arise from intercorrelated dispositional leanings
toward aggression, narcissism, disagreeableness, and low self-
control that have been linked to ARR-related phenomena in
other research (and that are all correlated at around r = 0.3,
McGregor, unpublished data). Trait-aggressive and narcissistic
people are especially receptive to aggressive media exposure
and inclined toward displaced hostile reactions to frustration,
perceived provocation, and rejection (Bushman, 1995; Bushman
and Baumeister, 1998; Anderson and Dill, 2000; Twenge and
Campbell, 2003). Narcissistic and the other “dark tetrad” traits
of psychopathy Machiavellianism and sadism (Paulhus, 2014)
are signiﬁcantly correlated with each other and with high
agency, low agreeableness, punitiveness, and callous low empathy
(Watson et al., 1984; Campbell et al., 2002; Paulhus and
Williams, 2002; Vernon et al., 2008; Jones and Paulhus, 2010;
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McGregor et al., 2013a). Aggressive reactions to threats are
approach-motivated (Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009), and
should accordingly focus one on tenacious personal goals with
diminished regard for others’ perspectives (Hogeveen et al., 2014;
Sassenrath et al., 2014). Indeed, people with low agreeableness
scores are mistrusting, devious, selﬁsh, stubborn, arrogant, and
callous (Costa and McCrae, 1991). Low self-control is also
associated with delinquency, criminal behavior, physical and
verbal aggression, self-directed aggression, and extreme and risky
reactions to various environmental threats (Tagney et al., 2004;
Nash, unpublished data; see also links with low conscientiousness
and the dark personality traits, Jakobwitz and Egan, 2006). High
scores on these intercorrelated and highly heritable oppositional
traits should accordingly predispose people to the appeal of ARR,
if other traits, threats, and aﬀordances are also conducive (Costa
and McCrae, 1991; Miles and Carey, 1997; Baker et al., 2008;
Vernon et al., 2008; Beaver et al., 2009).
It is important to emphasize that these predisposing
tendencies need not be in the abnormal range. The vast majority
of ARR perpetrators have normal range traits. Our hypothesis
is that even normal range tendencies should be enough to
combine with the other factors to make ARR appealing. There
are also several diﬀerent kinds of ARR for which the conducive
personality traits are likely diﬀerentially important. For example,
lone-wolf perpetrators and leaders of ARR movements should be
most likely to score highly on oppositional traits. In contrast, the
foot soldiers and joiners of established movements may be less
likely to be oppositional and social dominance oriented, and are
more likely to be submissive authoritarians who participate in the
oppositional tendencies by association (Son Hing et al., 2007).
Anxious
By anxious traits we mean those associated with a predisposition
toward BIS activity that may or may not be reﬂected in
consciously self-reported state anxiety (which can be attenuated
by defenses and which is often out of sync with physiological
indicators). The BIS generates early signals conducive to
anxiety, vigilance, and caution in uncertain or conﬂict-laden
circumstances, and people with anxious traits are more inclined
than others toward these responses (Hirsh and Inzlicht, 2008;
Proulx et al., 2012). Correlational studies show reliable links
between anxious and aggressive traits (e.g., rs of 0.4 and 0.5
between neuroticism and measures of aggression and hostility
in our recent sample of 299 culturally diverse college students;
McGregor, unpublished data; see also Jakobwitz and Egan, 2006).
Anxious arousal also mediates defensive reactivity. After
threats, if participants can misattribute their anxious arousal
to a mundane external cause (e.g., a placebo, or uncomfortable
room) they no longer react defensively to threats by rationalizing
or becoming extreme (reviewed in Jonas et al., 2014). Anxiety-
related need for structure also mediates the eﬀect of threats
on worldview defense (Agroskin and Jonas, 2013). Anxiety-
related traits and states including felt uncertainty, trait
neuroticism, uncertainty-aversion, need for structure, and
sense of victimhood, also moderate defensively extreme lifestyle
choice, worldview defense, violence, and religious zeal reactions
to uncertainty, mortality, control deprivation, and relationship
insecurity threats (Hirschberger et al., 2009; Juhl and Routledge,
2010; McGregor et al., 2010b, 2013b; Agroskin, unpublished
doctoral thesis).
The interconnected and anxiety-linked constructs of low
implicit self-esteem and relationship attachment insecurity
(DeHart et al., 2006) similarly moderate distressed, aggressive,
extreme, and worldview zealous reactions to failure, relationship,
insecurity, and mortality threats (Mikulincer and Florian, 2000;
McGregor and Marigold, 2003; Jordan et al., 2005; McGregor
et al., 2005; McGregor and Jordan, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2009;
Laurin et al., 2014; Nash et al., 2014).
Recent advances in techniques for indirect assessment of
states related to anxiety have also begun to implicate anxious
distress in ARR reactions. A wide variety of threats that have
caused ARR-related defenses in past research only inconsistently
arouse self-reported anxiety. However, almost all of them have
been shown to heighten electrical activity source-localized to the
anterior cingulate cortex of the brain which has been associated
with anxious distress and BIS activation (Proulx et al., 2012).
These same threats also elevate self-reported anxious distress
that is delayed or retrospective, presumably because delay or
retrospection evades the defenses that can obscure self-reports of
anxious distress immediately after threats (McGregor et al., 2001;
Nash et al., 2011; Agroskin, unpublished doctoral thesis). Taken
together in light of recent RAM theorizing (Jonas et al., 2014), the
links betweenARR-related phenomena and BIS-related states and
traits suggest that anxious traits related to high BIS activity should
predispose people towards using ARR to mask their distress.
High BIS personalities may also be drawn to ARR because
of their discomfort with abstraction and their attraction to
concrete engagement in low-level thoughts and goals. High
BIS personalities feel energized and mobilized by immersion in
details of concrete action and are averse to focus on abstract
reasons for “why” which can cue distressing rumination. Indeed,
concreteness manipulations (e.g., being randomly assigned to
write about the “how” vs. “why” of various goals) not only
relieve distress after anxious experiences (Watkins et al., 2008)
but also causes high BIS participants to run harder and burnmore
calories on a treadmill endurance test, squeeze with more tenacity
on a hand-gripper, persist to better performance in a speeded
data-entry task, report higher eager excitement on a self-report
questionnaire, to feel more optimism about personal goals, and
show an increase in left frontal brain activity, characteristic of
approach motivation (Tran et al., unpublished manuscript).
High BIS personalities may prefer the clarity of concrete action
to the ambiguity of abstraction because focus on concrete steps
regarding what to do alleviates the potentially bewildering tangle
of uncertainties about values and identity, especially for identity-
weak people (Vallacher and Wegner, 1989; Baumeister, 1991).
Developmentally, however, patience with uncertain abstraction
may be required if one is to identify, simulate, and hone
reliable personal values to identify with (Adorno et al., 1950;
Erikson, 1959; Marcia, 1980). Values need to be test-driven in
comparison with other existential options before they can be
adopted as an autonomous and intrinsically motivating part of
personal identity (Ryan and Deci, 2000; La Guardia, 2009). This
uncertain discovery process is more likely to feel threatening
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for people with high BIS reactivity whose anxiety circuits are
most easily overloaded by uncertainty (Hirsh and Inzlicht, 2008).
For them, defenses that allow escape from anxious conﬂicts by
either unmitigated approach or avoidance motivation would be
appealing (cf; Marcia, 1980; Jonas et al., 2014; Hayes et al., 2015).
When anxious people choose the approach route, they should
accordingly be especially drawn to concrete and immediate
commitments that limit exposure to the anxious burdens of
abstract selfhood (Baumeister, 1986). They should also be drawn
to the fascist structure of ARR groups that can provide direction
and a sense of meaning without requiring self-clarity. Indeed,
when faced with mortality reminders, mildly depressed people
were most likely to bolster meaning with jingoistic judgments
(Simon et al., 1998). Concrete and active engagement with fascist
groups should accordingly hit the motivational sweet spot for
anxious people by allowing them to restore approach motivated
states without having to think abstractly.
Identity-Weak
At any choice point, people can imagine multiple possibilities
for action. Classic and contemporary theories of human choice
and goal regulation hold that identity-strong people constrain
the potential for uncertainty and conﬂict among imagined
alternatives by using idealistic abstractions (i.e., highest values)
for guidance (reviewed in McGregor, 2004, 2006b, 2007).
Committed identiﬁcation with high values can help guide choices
and thereby allow people to function with conﬁdence and eﬃcacy
through frustrating or uncertain circumstances (Lydon and
Zanna, 1990; Kroger and Marcia, 2011). Put another way, clarity
about how to be can eﬀectively guide what to do. Committed
values function like abstract goals and can also activate approach
motivation directly and further relieve anxious distress by mere
reﬂection (McGregor et al., 2001, Study 1; Creswell et al., 2006;
McGregor, 2006a; McGregor et al., 2012b). Indeed, for highly
meaning-seeking people, even brief reﬂection on personal values
activates approach motivated states (neural, perceptual, and self-
report evidence in McGregor, unpublished data).
In contrast, identity-weak people who lack clear value
identiﬁcations to guide action and relieve anxious distress are
less able to cope constructively with frustrating circumstances.
Indeed, identity-weak people (i.e., with low scores on a trait
measure of idealism) reacted to mortality, control deprivation,
failure, and relationship threats by becoming especially anxious,
bewildered, and demotivated (McGregor and Marigold,
2003; Ferriday, unpublished master thesis; Prentice et al.,
unpublished data). Self-doubt also predicts materialistic
reactions to uncertainty (Chang and Arkin, 2002). Moreover,
when simultaneously confronted with multiple vulnerabilities
and threats (life-dissatisfaction, goal frustration, mortality
salience) identity-weak people become fatalistically withdrawn
from personal goals, report being depressed, and report that
they wish to live shorter lives (Hayes et al., 2015). In contrast,
identity-strong people (i.e., high self-esteem, high scores on
trait idealism) cope with anxious distress relatively easily by
focusing on personal ideals about self-worth or value conviction
that activate approach motivated states and thereby relieve the
anxiety (Dodgson and Wood, 1998; McGregor and Marigold,
2003; McGregor, 2006a;McGregor et al., 2007, 2009a; Schmeichel
et al., 2009; Nash et al., 2010; Schumann et al., 2014; see also
McGregor et al., 2010a for evidence that experimentally priming
ideals can also activate this process).
When high personal values (which are usually prosocial;
Crocker et al., 2008; Schumann et al., 2014) are not available or
salient, on the other hand, we propose that people will be more
likely to revert to concrete, angry, controlling, and jingoistic foci.
All can activate palliative approach motivation in a concrete way
(Keltner et al., 2003; Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009; McGregor,
unpublished data). Participants with low scores on a dispositional
idealism scale also reacted to social-order and relationship-
security threats by becoming especially bewildered, and by
becoming extremely devoted to the concrete and social (angry,
group-related) aspects of religious zeal but not the abstract
personal. After threat they rated their personal goals in life as
being more random and out of control, and reported more
willingness to support war and die for their religious beliefs,
more allegiance to their own religious group, more hostility and
less openness to people with diﬀerent religious beliefs, more
conﬁdence that God would give them power and take care of
them, and more willingness to go to extremes for God (Ferriday,
unpublished master thesis).
Both high self-esteem and idealism are signiﬁcantly correlated
with each other and with other constructs related to personal
agency (McGregor et al., 2007, Study 2). People with low
scores on either self-esteem or idealism report signiﬁcantly
lower power, self-control, drive, hope, and eﬃcacy, and higher
anxiety, depression, and rumination (McGregor, unpublished
data). The low personal agency arising from diﬃculty with ideals
is consistent with classic and contemporary theories of the self-
regulatory role of ideals and values. Accordingly, when people
lack personal agency they cleave to sources of group-based and
external control, through heightened allegiance to active groups,
external agencies, and religious authority (Fritsche et al., 2008,
2011, 2013; Kay et al., 2010; Landau et al., 2015; Stollberg et al.,
2015).
On the surface it may seem perverse to argue that aggressive
religious radicals are identity-weak when their rhetoric brims
with moral certainty and megalomanic conviction. Theories
of narcissism, however, hold that such overt entitlement and
importance is a reaction to weak capacity for nuanced and viable
ideals. The rigid narcissistic shell shields against anxious distress
of a vulnerable and lost soul (Kohut, 1971; Kernberg, 1975; see
also Kroger and Marcia, 2011, for related research on identity
foreclosure). Indeed, reactive narcissistic rage, punitiveness, and
callous disregard for others is especially prevalent among people
whose entitled grandiosity is belied by vulnerability and shame
(McGregor et al., 2005, 2013a; Krizan and Johar, 2015). From this
perspective, ARR is a kind of narcissistic response that appeals
to identity-weak people. They should be most vulnerable to the
dubious and grandiose religious ideals that animate ARR because
they have no clear opposing identity and are most in need of
bolstering and escaping the problematic self. Accordingly, they
should be most inclined both toward extremes of bolstering the
self by joining ARR groups (Fritsche et al., 2013; Swann and
Buhrmester, 2015), and de-individuated escaping of the self by
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cleaving to group authority (Postmes and Spears, 1998). Both
processes would orient them toward group loyalty and angry,
concrete action without pangs of conscience.
In sum, clear values provide resilience in the face of anxious
distress. They aid instrumental coping by providing agile capacity
for assessing, prioritizing, and adjusting goals. They also provide
a ready focus for activating approach motivation and relieving
anxiety. They thereby help people cope with life’s frustrations,
choices, and uncertainties in instrumental and palliative ways.
Without authentic and conﬁdent personal value identiﬁcations,
some other arbiter for making choices and soothing anxious
distress is necessary. Rigid (concrete, literal) and extreme
commitment to hostile, fascist, and authoritarian groups may be
a default alternative for the dispositionally inclined.
Threat
External Threat
For people like those just described who are dispositionally
reliant on external sources of agency, threats that undermine
external sources of agency shouldmakeARR especially appealing.
When personal control is weak (i.e., for anxious and identity-
weak people) or unavailable, and a source of external agency
(e.g., ingroup, god, government) is threatened, people should be
inclined to switch allegiance to another seemingly viable source
of external agency (Kay et al., 2008, 2010). Feeling excluded or
alienated, or like one’s ingroup was unfairly treated or humiliated,
or one’s country was out of control should make people with weak
capacity for personal agency turn to other sources of external
agency, such as ARR.
Preliminary support for this hypothesis comes from research
showing that whereas high dispositional idealism predicts
reactive personal agency (for personal goals and personal beliefs)
after a personal agency threat (i.e., zeal for personal beliefs
after a failure experience; McGregor et al., 2007, 2010b); low
dispositional idealism predicts reactive allegiance to external
religious agency after an external control threat (i.e., willingness
to go to extremes for God and religious groups, and claims
to derive strength and safety from a powerful God after
threats to important relationships or to economic stability;
Ferriday, unpublished master thesis). Based on these results
and our extension of compensatory control and group-based
control theories (Kay et al., 2010; Fritsche et al., 2013) we
expect that because identity-weak people rely on external
sources of agency in uncertain circumstances they should
be especially bewildered and drawn to the external agency
of ARR when their other external sources of agency are
threatened.
Turning to ARR as a way to restore approach motivated
relief from distress could be precipitated by various threats
to institutional or relational sources of agency, such as
war, sanctions, economic instability, high unemployment,
system injustice, system incompetence, corruption, hypocrisy,
relative deprivation, and cultural marginalization, ridicule,
prejudice, ostracism, unfair social policies that relegate
disadvantaged people to inescapable cycles of humiliation
and hardship. Relational, domestic abuse, conﬂict, unfairness,
boredom, or uncertainty could have a similar eﬀect leaving
people feeling overwhelmed and frustrated. External threats,
whether societal or domestic should accordingly heighten
the appeal of ARR. Consistent with this external-threat
interpretation, the ﬁrst three reasons suggested for the rise
of IS relate to perceptions of systemic injustice against
Muslims: (1) Shia (Iran, Iraq, Syria) oppression of Sunnis,
(2) lack of conﬁdence in governmental ability to protect social
justice, and (3) the perception of a “Western-led onslaught”
against Muslims by the West and their coalition (Barrett,
2014b).
No Hope
If the present is grim and frustrations or chaos make the
near future seem hopeless, one can still look to the distant
future for redemption. Hope is an eager state, closely aligned
with approach motivation, and is negatively correlated with
anxiety (McGregor et al., 2012b). Indeed, when people are
confronted with anxiety-inducing threats, they respond by
exaggerating hopeful commitment in alternative domains
at near and far temporal distances as a way to activate
RAM and suppress anxiety (reviewed in Jonas et al., 2014).
But if all temporal horizons for hope, near and far, seem
blocked, then people simmer in impotent anxiety, get
depressed, and disengage from life. The combination of
present life-dissatisfaction, salience of near-future failure, and
mortality salience (that undermines distant future hope) made
participants became depressed, demotivated, disinterested
in personal goals, and less interested in living (Hayes et al.,
2015).
Such across-the board withdrawal from life goes against the
primal human motivation to strive, live, and love, however,
(Ryan and Deci, 2000). Accordingly, such no-hope predicaments
could be expected to vacillate between depression and fatalistic
withdrawal on the one hand, and anxiety arising from frustrated
eﬀorts to re-engage with life on the other. Such vacillation would
be conducive to ARR because the withdrawal would make people
more willing to forsake normal goals and even die, but the anxiety
would also orient them toward active participation in extreme
ARR as a source of group-based, external agency to activate RAM
for relief. ARR could be even more alluring because its utopian
elements transcend the frustrating limits of the hopeless temporal
world (Cohen et al., 2011).
It is important to note that neither threat nor hopelessness
is synonymous with objective personal failure, disadvantage,
or low SES. Hopelessness can refer to the plight of a
group one identiﬁes with (Wohl et al., 2010). It can also
refer to a sense of futility about reaching whatever standard
one has for oneself, high or low. Indeed, hopelessness
may become particularly acute when one has ostensibly
succeeded according to normative standards, but still feels
dissatisﬁed. Being wealthy and vocationally successful, for
example, but still feeling ostracized, socially excluded, alienated,
or meaningless might make one feel especially hopeless and
cynical about the viability of culturally available opportunities
for a good life. Similarly, even in aﬄuent circumstances
domestic dysfunction could trigger hopelessness about social
goals.
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Affordance
Salient Narratives and Opportunities Conducive to
Immediate, Concrete Engagement with Active Groups
The aforementioned combination of traits and threats should
make RAM via concrete engagement in active groups particularly
appealing. People intuitively turn to groups and consensus in
anxious circumstances because doing so can help people either
bolster or escape from their vulnerable or uncertain selves (e.g.,
Festinger et al., 1956; Solomon et al., 1991; Gardner et al.,
2002; McGregor et al., 2005; Fritsche et al., 2008). Fusing one’s
personal identity with a group identity can powerfully validate
and bolster conﬁdence in personal agency, liberating sacriﬁce
and risky extremes for the sake of the group (Swann and
Buhrmester, 2015). Groups can also support de-individuated
identiﬁcation as an escape from personal selfhood, and thereby
promote enactment of group norms and beliefs even if they
are anti-normative (Postmes and Spears, 1998). Authoritarian
groups may further facilitate conformity and obedience beyond
personal inclinations (Martin and Hewstone, 2003). Cleaving
to group norms as a way to escape self-uncertainty is a
theme long identiﬁed by existential philosophers and classic
developmental psychological perspectives as described in the
introduction. Authoritarian groups allow one to follow concrete
orders, focusing on the concrete topics of what to do and
how to do it instead of being responsible for grappling with
uncertain moral quandaries about why. Authoritarian groups
that explicitly specify immediate engagement in concrete action
should be especially appealing for anxious and identity-weak
people (Vallacher andWegner, 1989; Baumeister, 1991; Hogg and
Adelman, 2013; Tran et al., unpublished manuscript).
Indeed, people with barriers to personal agency react to
threats by cleaving speciﬁcally to active and agentic groups,
presumably because the groups’ agency can be internalized
as a surrogate or splint for personal agency (Hogg and
Adelman, 2013; Stollberg et al., 2015; cf. Landau et al.,
2015). Consistent with this group-based agency view, short
experimental manipulations of ingroup aﬃrmation or outgroup
derogation can activate approach motivated states (McGregor,
unpublished data). Approach motivation is an eager, conﬁdent,
and resilient state resistant to anxious distress (McGregor et al.,
2005, 2012b; Drake and Myers, 2006; Nash et al., 2011).
Concrete group-identiﬁcation allows anxious and identity-
weak people to escape the self in two ways—by eliminating
the ambiguities of moral abstraction by immersing in concrete
and immediate experience, and by splinting their problematic
personal identity with the authoritarian group identity. The
preference for active engagement is consistent with the ﬁnding
that previous involvement in active groups, like soccer teams,
service groups, or religious groups is a predictor of engagement
in ARR that is surprisingly superﬁcial in idealism beyond the
hostile and extremely black and white morality of us = good
vs. them = bad (Atran, 2010). Physical action is also more
concrete than ideas and values, and so would further appeal to
the anxious and identity-weak. IS training manuals that advise
recruits on the minutia of concrete planning practicalities like
bringing knee and elbow pads in readiness for immediate action
may thus feel exhilarating for anxious and identity-weak people.
Concrete engagement, even in suicidal aggression could feel like a
welcome adventure for oppositional, anxious, and identity-weak
people, fused to or highly identiﬁed with the power of active
groups (Baumeister, 1991; Hogg, 2014; Hayes et al., 2015; Swann
and Buhrmester, 2015). This may explain the explicitly concrete
declaration of Jihad against tyrants in the al-Qaeda terrorism
manual that states (from Post, 2005):
“The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate regimes
does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals, nor Aristotelian
diplomacy. But it knows the dialog of bullets, the ideals of
assassination, bombing and destruction, and the diplomacy of the
cannon and the machine gun.”
The concrete appeal of ARR may gel when narratives
rationalizing participation in ARR become consensually
endorsed in already-fused buddy groups (Atran, 2010) with
members searching for greater purpose and meaning in life
(Atran, 2015). As described next, we propose that ARR-
compelling narratives involve conspiracy theory grievances,
exaggerated cosmic signiﬁcance of participating in resistance,
rationalization for hostile retribution, and perceived legitimacy
of unfalsiﬁable truth claims (Armstrong, 2000, 2014; Barrett,
2014a; Ali, 2015).
Conspiracy Narratives
Experimentally manipulated threats related to anxiety (mortality
salience, low power, low control, frustration, and uncertainty)
increase belief in superstitions and conspiracy theories (reviewed
in Landau et al., 2015). The prevailing explanation for such
experimentally induced threat-to-conspiracy eﬀects is that belief
in externally controlling phenomena like conspiracy plots or
superstitious agencies helps make the world seem less random
and more orderly. Compensatory control theorists see the need
for order as so fundamental that people are even willing to accept
the existence of (delusional) enemies and evil forces if it can
reduce anxiety by restoring a perception of order. Even sinister
order is preferable to chaos (Sullivan et al., 2010).
Another possible interpretation of such anxiety-induced
superstitious/conspiracy eﬀects is that anxiety-related threats
cause a BIS-induced anxious vigilance that makes people over-
notice strange and malevolent possibilities, and to experience
the world as more out of control and random (as found by
Agroskin and Jonas, 2013). If anything could happen, then
maybe superstitions, evil forces, and conspiracies are true.
Moreover, the same combination of external threats and identity-
weak personality traits (e.g., low hope, low self-esteem, low
eﬃcacy, and low idealism) that result in persistent anxiety and
depression (Hayes et al., 2015) also increase superstitious and
supernatural belief (Prentice, unpublished master thesis; Prentice
et al., unpublished data; Ferriday, unpublished master thesis). We
are currently investigating whether this speciﬁc combination of
personality traits and external threats will also predict belief in
conspiracy theories, and if so whether this heightened belief is
a palliative antidote to anxiety (following compensatory control
theory), a symptom of anxiety (following the vigilant anxiety
view), or both.
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Whatever the mechanism, anxiety-related threats heighten
paranoid belief in conspiracy theories and enemyship. Salience
of consensually endorsed conspiracy theories should accordingly
be an important risk factor for ARR. In the Islamist context,
ubiquitous narratives about the hypocritical and callous abuses
of the Great Satan West and/or Zionist or Shia forces rationalize
Islamist ARR, andmake it seem legitimate. Cultural endorsement
reiﬁes the conspiracies (e.g., Hardin and Higgins, 1996) and
creates a ready focus for anxious vigilance aroused by hopeless
circumstances, and a convenient scapegoat target to ﬁght against
with palliative zeal. Conspiracy narratives were similarly used by
Christians to justify pogroms against Jews and Crusades against
Muslims during historical periods where Christians were the
ones experiencing cultural and existential threat (Durant, 1950;
Armstrong, 2000, 2014). The prevalence and cultural acceptance
of conspiracy theories should therefore be an aﬀordance that
promotes ARR.
Cosmic Moral Struggle
Once identiﬁed, the same combination of factors that makes
conspiracy theories attractive can also create extreme moral
conviction about polarized forces of good (us) vs. evil (them).
An ARR perpetrator described his motivation for ARR as follows
(from Sim, 2013):
“Jihad is a war purely to enforce Allah’s word. . .to protect Islam
and Muslims. . .widen Islamic power. . . and spread kindness and
the truth... It seemed that there was no eﬀective way to eﬀect change
and to stop all the destruction except to wage jihad—a war between
good and evil. When there is a war between good and evil, sinners
will be afraid of the swords of the mujahidin. Thus, cruelty will
be demolished gradually. My involvement with bombing has a
personal purpose and hope. We bomb those whom we think of as the
enemy and also in order to fulﬁll the obligation of jihad for Allah. . .
On the battleﬁeld, it will be seen who is good and who is evil . . .
Jihad . . . is a pure war which is ordered by Allah. I always pray to
be given the ability and opportunities to carry out my obligation to
do jihad.”
As reviewed in Jonas et al. (2014) hundreds of experiments
have demonstrated that anxiety-related threats make people
go to moral extremes. The direction of the extremist urge
under threat can be guided by salient cultural norms, whether
antisocial or prosocial. Salient cultural or religious narratives
that promote polarized views of goodness (us) vs. evil (them)
and make every small action by an individual on behalf
of the ﬁght seem signiﬁcant may thus provide especially
attractive refuge (Pyszczynski et al., 2006; Kruglanski et al.,
2014). Such oversimpliﬁed cosmic struggle narratives are
like ultra-conspiracy theories with opportunity for action-
oriented participation. Frustrations and conﬂicts on the ground
become infused with universal signiﬁcance, unencumbered
by complicating details of concrete reality. Aggressive justice
restoration becomes a simple and easily accessible ideology that
the identity-weak can readily harbor in private imagination.
For people seeking relief from temporal frustrations and
uncertainties, exiting the temporal realm and concretely ﬁghting
for the sake of transcendent abstractions is intoxicating. Pure
ideals and anger can activate sanguine, approach motivated states
economically and anonymously in one’s own mind (McGregor,
2007; Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009). These oversimpliﬁed
idealistic surrogates may be especially attractive to identity-
weak people who feel morally bereft. Indeed, idealistically bereft
converts with little religious education often become among the
most zealous perpetrators of ARR (Barrett, 2014a,b; Atran, 2015).
For them, the utopian appeal of IS may be particularly alluring.
Violence Justification
Aggression is a primal reaction to frustration, especially
if aggressive cues are salient (Berkowitz, 1989). This may be
because anger is a powerful lever for approach-motivation
(Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009), and approach motivated
states mute anxious distress (Corr, 2008; Nash et al., 2012).
Imagining and enacting aggressive revenge should therefore feel
rewarding in frustrating and anxious circumstances. Classic and
new research on reactive aggression emphasizes that just as
ambient cues moderate the direction of antisocial vs. prosocial
ideology after threats, the ambient cues moderate the extent to
which frustration causes aggression (Berkowitz, 1989; reviewed
in Jonas et al., 2014). Salient narratives that prime and justify
ARR are therefore essential for its reactive appeal. Enthusiasm
for punitive justice may initially get provoked by outrage
over ingroup suﬀering, and become ampliﬁed by conspiracy
theories with cosmic signiﬁcance that ignites angry eagerness
to ﬁght against the evil unfairness. Narratives that excuse ARR
violence as holy, necessary, and just—‘they deserve it’ (e.g., as
described in Sim, 2013) may be necessary to release this eager
fury from normal social constraints against aggression. Indeed,
group consensus can provide validation and legitimization
for murderous activities that would otherwise be considered
universally immoral and more stressful to participate in (Webber
et al., 2013).
The same factors that make aggressive narratives appealing
may also heighten willingness to subject oneself to risky
commitments, reduce capacity for consideration of what one has
to lose, and reduce capacity for awareness of others’ suﬀering.
Threat-induced RAM makes people take more risks and become
insensitive to distress. Eager approach cues predominate, and
the salience of aversive stimuli fade to seem less motivationally
relevant (Nash, unpublished doctoral dissertation). Eager
religious narratives bent around the psychological reward for
martyrdom, and courageous aggression against inﬁdels with
callous disregard for their suﬀering would therefore resonate
with the motivational conﬁguration of ARR. The recent spate
of Islamist ARR shares a common narrative originating from
Wahabi/Salaﬁst thought that justiﬁes extreme violence against
apostates and inﬁdels (Barrett, 2014b). Such callous and violence-
encouraging narratives have gained traction in radical sects of all
major religious traditions during periods of cultural anxiety and
hopelessness (Armstrong, 2000, 2014; cf. Ali, 2015).
Unfalsifiability
Supernatural authority also helps preserve dubious distortions
and rationalizations that can make ARR seem legitimate.
Anxiogenic threats cause anxious and identity-weak people to
more strongly endorse transcendent religious explanations for
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personal well-being and world events (McGregor et al., 2010b,
Study 1; Ferriday, unpublished master thesis). An advantage
of supernatural religious narratives rooted in transcendent
and historical authority beyond physical proof is that they
can be unfalsiﬁably asserted without the inconvenience of
evidence and without the possibility of conﬂict. They can be
bolstered merely by appeals to traditional authority and social
consensus. Accordingly, experimentally manipulated threats
cause people to spontaneously frame their moral arguments as
more unfalsiﬁable, and randomly assigned unfalsiﬁability causes
arguments to become more extreme and aggressive against
dissenters (Friesen et al., 2015). Religious unfalsiﬁability may
therefore be an important aﬀordance that both consolidates
zeal and spurs conﬁdent and militant action for ARR (cf. Ali,
2015).
Hypothesis Testing
In the Laboratory
To test our multifactor hypothesis blocks of experiments could
separately test the personality, threat, and aﬀordance variables
while holding the active ingredients from the other blocks
constant. We would predict a three way interaction with highest
endorsement of ARR among participants whose personalities are
most oppositional, anxious, and identity-weak (with conducive
threat and aﬀordance circumstances primed for all). The best
constellation of speciﬁc traits for each of the latent personality
variables could be modeled with structural equation modeling.
The ARR scenario participants would be asked to rate for the
dependent variable would be plausibly tailored to the sample (as
in Pyszczynski et al., 2006).
The threat block of experiments could experimentally
manipulate externally imposed threat with mortality,
relationship-distress, system-collapse, or injustice salience
(vs. neutral) manipulations. Hopelessness could be manipulated
by randomly assigning participants to write about a high eﬀort
commitment that did not pay oﬀ vs. one that did pay oﬀ (as in
Hayes et al., 2015) or about an ongoing ingroup injustice with
no hope vs. hope for abatement. Participants preselected with
conducive personalities and primed with the aﬀordance variables
should show highest endorsement of ARR in the external threat/
hopeless circumstances condition.
To test the aﬀordance block of variables, participants
preselected for conducive personality traits and primed with the
conducive threat variables would rate the appeal of six diﬀerent
randomly assigned versions of an ARR scenario. In ﬁve of the
conditions only four of the aﬀordance variables would be woven
into the scenario. In the sixth condition, all ﬁve aﬀordance
variables would be present. ARR should be most prevalent in a
sixth condition with all ﬁve aﬀordance variables present.
Once each factor was established, a ﬁnal study could
test the entire model in a large 2 (personality) × 2
(threat) × 2 (aﬀordance) between subjects design. Participants
would be preselected based on combined high vs. low
personality predisposition and the threat and aﬀordance
factors would be experimentally manipulated. Highest
endorsement of ARR would be expected in the conducive
personality/threat/aﬀordance cell.
Interview Studies
Biographical analysis should also reveal personality × threat ×
aﬀordance factors among ARR perpetrators. Thousands of
foreign ﬁghters are returning home from participation in ARR,
many who are disillusioned and might be willing to participate
in research designed to help understand the phenomenon. They
could be comprehensively tested and interviewed to assess the
adequacy of the proposed multifactor hypotheses if researchers
could get access to them (Sim, 2013; Sageman, 2014). Interviews
could also be conducted in international hotbeds that produce
inordinately high numbers of ARR recruits to test for prevalence
of conducive factors (The Soufan Group, 2015).
Real World
Interventions aimed at mitigating personality, threat, or
aﬀordance factors could be targeted or observed while
controlling for the other two factors. Many aspects of personality
trait dispositions are stable across time, but two aspects of ARR
conducive personality might be amenable to intervention. Traits
rooted in anxiety-related insecurities are aﬀected by relationship
responsiveness and security (e.g., Bokhorst et al., 2003; DeHart
et al., 2006; Fearon et al., 2006). Policy or programs that provided
access to aﬀordable daycare or other resources to reduce stress
for caregivers could help. Public education about importance
of responsive connection and autonomy support for children
and ill-eﬀects of authoritarian parenting could also be promoted
(Ryan and Deci, 2000).
A second aspect of ARR conducive personality amenable
to intervention is identity-weakness. Provision of adequate
structure to support youth’s developing sense of eﬃcacy and
autonomy, and interventions that promote pro-social values and
belonging in experientially engaging groups could help bolster
authentic intrinsic motivation to stabilize identity and inoculate
against ARR (Ryan and Deci, 2000; Walton and Cohen, 2007,
2011; cf. Cohen and Sherman, 2014). The same manipulations
could also decrease anxious reactivity (Creswell et al., 2006).
A set of quasi-experimental and intervention studies could
also focus on factors aﬀecting threat variables. They could assess
whether ARR varies with externally threatening and hopeless
social conditions, e.g., exposure to economic disruption,
sanctions, invasions, occupations, mass-displacements,
wars, political instability, institutional corruption, natural
disasters, racial proﬁling, police brutality, judicial unfairness,
unemployment, social ostracism vs. integration, accessibility
of social services and acculturation support. Intervention
experiments could follow up by enriching one of two matched
communities with social programs that build infrastructure
and systems to help culturally vulnerable immigrants cope, feel
welcome, and able to hope. ARR incidence could be compared
before and after interventions as well as to incidence in matched
communities not receiving the interventions.
Similar studies could assess prevalence of the aﬀordance
factors and ARR. Countering ARR narratives with accessible and
credible alternatives has been identiﬁed as a crucial intervention
point (The Soufan Group, 2013; Atran, 2015). Eﬀects of
providing opportunity for active engagement in meaningful
group activities suﬀused by prosocial narratives could be tested.
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Non-radical religious engagement might be particularly eﬀective.
Religious devotion is a powerful and mutable human response
to the pervasive appeal of consensual moral clarity in action.
Anxious humans yearn for moral devotion. The best defense
against narratives that support the darker mutations might be
opportunity for participation in narratives that uphold the lighter
ones, and intrinsic religiosity is universally prosocial (Jonas and
Fischer, 2006; Armstrong, 2009; Schumann et al., 2014; Shariﬀ
et al., 2015). To be eﬀective, the counter-narratives would need to
equally address local grievances, and have as much opportunity
for experiential linkage to active engagement, adventure, and
intimate group involvement as ARR narratives do (The Soufan
Group, 2013; Atran, 2015).
Intervention studies in countries where most young people
go to school could test the eﬀects of counter-ARR education.
Comparative religion curricula could reveal the history of
world religions and weakness of violent religious arguments.
Objectively debunked conspiracy theories, such as The Protocols
of the Elders of Zion, could also be exposed, and examples
of inter-religious cooperation could be featured (political
apologies for actual historical injustices could also help; Blatz
et al., 2009). The history and psychology of extreme, rigid
belief systems could also be taught, summarizing the now
100s of experiments showing that intuitive moral certainty
can be defensive and is an unreliable index of objective
truth. Developmental and historical aberrations toward zealous
extremism and aggression could be revealed as such and the
centrality of mystery, humility, and compassion as fundamental
to religious piety across traditions could be taught (Armstrong,
2000, 2009).
Importantly, eﬀects of these real-world interventions would
need to be carefully evaluated. De-radicalization and risk-
reduction programs that try to mitigate threat and aﬀordance
factors for at-risk individuals are already in place in the United
Kingdom, Indonesia, Singapore, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain,
Denmark, and elsewhere. They already combine elements of
integration and support for immigrants, community resilience
resources, and religious education with tools to counter ARR
propaganda. What is missing is systematic program evaluation
of what works and what does not work (Qatar International
Academy for Security Studies, 2010). We submit that our
hypotheses, derived from psychological theory and research,
could help guide interventions and program evaluations in the
real world. Given their current uncertainty about root causes of
ARR, it is not surprising that politicians are reluctant to wade
into that theoretical murkiness. Strong-arm punishment is a safer
strategy. The Conservative Prime Minister of Canada recently
dismissed interest in root causes of ARR with the unapologetic
quip “this is not a time to commit sociology” after the arrest
of religious radicals who had plotted to blow up a Canadian
train (Fitzpatrick, 2013). He then announced a new bombing
campaign against IS, and pushed through new anti-terror laws
with unprecedented violation of civil rights.
Our hypotheses predict that punitive and fairness-violating
social policies are as likely to exacerbate as quell ARR. ARR
groups are fueled by an “ideology of protest” rooted in local
grievances about maltreatment (The Soufan Group, 2013; The
Economist, 2015). Brutal crackdowns fuel this ﬁre. Post (2005)
concluded that religious violence is driven by the psychological
appeal of displaced aggression, for people who feel oppressed
and hopeless. He further emphasized how cultural narratives
across generations breed deep ideological hatred. His view
converges with ours, in its conclusion that the appeal of ARR
is psychological, and should be countered with psychological,
at least as much as military intelligence. Atran (2015) similarly
identiﬁed a psychological motivation for ARR as primarily
idealistic:
Most have had no traditional religious education, and are often
“born again” into a socially tight, ideologically narrow but world-
spanning sense of religious mission... Violent extremism represents
not the resurgence of traditional cultures, but their collapse, as
young people unmoored from millennial traditions ﬂail about in
search of a social identity that gives personal signiﬁcance and glory.
He further notes the importance of action groups that provide
opportunity to act with “deep conviction of moral virtue,” and
that “sacred value must be fought with other sacred values.”
“When, as now, the focus is on military solutions and police
interdiction, matters have already gone way too far. If that
focus remains, we lose the coming generation.” We hope
that the recent empirical advances in personality and social
psychological knowledge about root causes of ARR together with
new knowledge derived from the hypotheses described above will
augment converging insights from other disciplines, and help
make wisdom drawn from psychological science a credible option
for leaders grappling with ARR.
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